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THE LIBERAL AND FASCIST ERA
Laura Cerasi (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia)
If we look at the public discourse in late liberal Italy, or, more specifi-
cally, if we consider the widespread production of political pamphlets, 
written by prominent politicians and influential journalists and tackling 
the imperial issue, then the basic evidence we have to acknowledge is that 
in the imperial visions and longings of the time, to talk Empire, to make 
references to the concept of Empire, meant to refer to the British Empire. 
And not surprisingly: for a nation still in its developing stages as Italy was 
during the early twentieth century, striving to accelerate its own mod-
ernization and industrialization, but still suffering from many hindrances 
such as poverty, emigration, low wages and illiteracy, the British Empire 
appeared to be the very embodiment of modern power and strength. 
Having an imperial dimension was an essential attribute of modernity and 
dominance, as the British Empire had been experiencing and proving for 
the previous two centuries.
Britain continued to appear, either in Liberal and Fascist Italy, the 
epitome of empire: to be admired or despised, to be pursued or chal-
lenged, the British Empire was the model. Any symptom of its weaken-
ing, or even decadence, was closely scrutinized, because it opened the 
possibility for other countries to compete: in Liberal Italy with prudence 
and reverence, in Fascist Italy with bold challenge. The shift between the 
two extremes draws a trajectory which moves from the earnest admiration 
of the powerful economic British supremacy to the harsh Anglophobia 
intensely proclaimed by the Fascist propaganda, especially during and 
after the Ethiopian campaign (1935-1936). In the 1930s signs of the 
British Empire’s decline were sought, developing the idea in Gibbon’s 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that British domination would also 
rise and fall, and announcing the replacement of the “British order”, 
founded on commercial modernity and the strength of money and capital, 
by Fascism’s new civilization, with its authentic heritage of imperial 
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romanità. At the turn of the eighteenth century Gibbon had seen Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire as a metaphor for future British rule, then 
in the ascendant, thus heralding a tangle of intersected references to the 
heritage of the Roman Empire and the claim of its legacies, which pointed 
to different conceptions of Empire.
1. industrialism, imperialism and modernity
Before the rise of Fascism, commercial, capitalist and industrial moder-
nity had been a matter of great fascination for observers of the British 
Empire at its peak, due to its representation of the “natural” expression 
of economic strength. This had marked a significant variation in perspective 
from the essentially liberal political importance that it was given by 
nineteenth-century anglophiles.1 Journalist Olindo Malagodi, in a book 
compiled in London, while he was correspondent for the Giolittian La 
Tribuna, highlighted imperialism’s interdependence with deployment of 
the power of industrialism. The imperial expansion was an inevitable 
product of its historical development: “Imperialism is not justified except 
when and where the conditions exist that give it a purpose; when it creates, 
rather than just destroying; when it contributes something, rather than 
just taking away from the peoples where it is imposed; when it sows the seeds 
of a higher existence among the inevitable ruins left in its wake. The only 
genuine and necessary imperialism of our times is therefore that which 
comes from industrial civilization.”2 
Malagodi had seen in the emergence of militarism, made apparent in 
the Boer Wars, “a serious symptom of the degeneration of modern impe-
rialism”: “What are the relationships between that progressive and peace-
loving civilization that we believed and hoped should conquer the world, 
just with the strength of its organic superiority, and these new imperialist 
ambitions and recent episodes of militarism that appear to contradict that 
hope and trust?”3
Militarism and industrialism, he believed, were two antithetical terms, 
and British imperialism, generated by its industrial leadership, was at risk 
of mutating should it give in to the call for armed force. Malagodi implicitly 
recalled the well-known formula popularized by John Seeley, who in The 
1 See Cerasi, Anglophilia in Crisis; Biagini, “Anglofilia e storiografia”; Cammarano, “Il 
modello costituzionale inglese nell’Italia liberale”.
2 Malagodi, Imperialismo, 295. All the translations from the Italian are by Stuart 
Oglethorpe, with the exception of Dalla Volta’s and Pellizzi’s, which are mine.
3 Malagodi, Imperialismo, 5.
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Expansion of England remarked that “we seem, as it were, to have con-
quered the world in a fit of absence of mind”,4 by commenting that “the 
old peace-loving Britain, as I have observed, built its empire without 
seeking to do so and almost without realizing, driven by its own organic 
energy”. And he noted that “this creative energy has in fact for several 
years been weakened, or has come up against the new energy of other 
peoples”,5 among which had to be included “those small new peoples 
who show that they have great qualities, like the Boers, who have done 
such magnificent work as agricultural pioneers on the vast high plains of 
southern Africa”.6 It was indeed the Second Boer War, then under way, 
that was the indicator of this mutation: “The war in the Transvaal has 
shown Britain undergoing a profound transformation. This conflict has 
gone against all those high ideals of international justice that Britain had 
advocated since the start of the century, and that had made it so popular 
among other nations; it has gone against many of those new formulas for 
imperial expansion that it had discovered and been the first to apply, and 
to which British imperialism owed its good fortune among the pitiful 
failures of its rivals; but worse still, it has revealed an extraordinary meta-
morphosis of the country’s spirit. [...] In this visage can be seen the strain 
and violent tension of a proud will, together with the bitter unease of a 
secret sense of weakness.”7 
The exercise of force thus paradoxically heralded the beginning of the 
decline of the world’s richest and most civilised nation, whose rule was 
no longer asserted with “absent-minded” ease, but had to be harshly 
imposed. In this, Malagodi echoed arguments that were circulating 
widely in European political and cultural discussions of the time.8 By 
employing armed force rather than the supremacy of its wealth and 
civilization, moreover against the Boers, a white population of European 
origin, Britain was putting itself on the same level as the other powers 
engaged in imperialist competition. The brutality of the military cam-
paign in the Transvaal appeared to reveal how British expansion was 
fueled by the most basic instinct for supremacy. In the Nuova Antologia, 
not usually thought to be anti-British, the Boers were likened to the 
Greeks at Thermopylae, and their challenge to the world’s greatest colo-
nial empire was seen as “heroic” as it was motivated by issues of national 
4 Seeley, The Expansion of England, 10.
5 Malagodi, Imperialismo, 29.
6 Ibid., 401.
7 Ibid., 27-29.
8 See Omissi and Thompson, The Impact of the South African War. For the repercus-
sions in Italy, see Mangoni, Una crisi fine secolo, 226.
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independence.9 As the Anglo-Florentine novelist Ouida observed, “when 
an enormously rich and arrogant nation, able to draw on vast resources, 
fights for reasons of greed a relatively poor people, small in number and 
with no external support, victory of the former can never be noble or 
worthy”.10 
Among the chorus of criticism for British aggression, which had few 
dissenting voices,11 there were also some tones of satisfaction over the 
“normalization” of British primacy, which until then had been seen as 
beyond compare. The questioning of this was an important reason for the 
continuing success of a pamphlet which had explored the causes of 
“Anglo-Saxon superiority”, exciting great interest and quickly reaching its 
twenty-sixth printing, while being translated into the main European lan-
guages.12 Edmonde Demolins, a sociologist in the tradition of Le Play, 
held that the explanation for Britain’s undisputed superiority lay not in 
its history and culture, as was argued by Guglielmo Ferrero at much the 
same time, but in its educational system. Ferrero argued that the superior-
ity of Anglo-Saxon peoples (in which he included the German popula-
tions) was due to the transformation of the chaotic and primordial warrior 
instinct for supremacy in the ordered channeling of individual energies 
into industrial and commercial development, which was the keystone of 
Anglo-Saxon primacy.13 To close the gap, the solution was to reproduce 
the educational model believed to be best for creating “colonizing man”: 
private schools, with much sport and practical activity, Demolins’ pamphlet 
was suffused by clear intentions to compete, and his suggestions were 
received in Italy in the same vein, thus linking together imperialism, indi-
vidualism and modernity, for that matter drawing on an established 
model, introduced by the success of Guglielmo Ferrero’s Europa Giovane 
which popularized the notion of the Anglo-Saxon societies as the fore-
front of the development of civilization, due to the non-community 
nature of their main social ties. Many of the ills afflicting Italian society 
could be addressed by taking inspiration from “education for individual-
ism”: “The British system of education develops men, not employees; it 
prepares people for the struggle for life; it keeps ‘home’ free from many 
low vices; it gives the individual high levels of dignity and moral worth; 
9 Nobili Vitelleschi, “La questione del Transvaal. Lettera dall’Inghilterra”, 351.
10 Ouida, “Joseph Chamberlain”, 584.
11 These voices included Il Regno, the magazine of Enrico Corradini, a great admirer 
of the expansionism of Joseph Chamberlain: see Calderoni, “Nazionalismo antiprotezio-
nista?”, 5-7. See also Demolins, Boers et Anglais: où est le droit? 
12 Demolins, À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons? 
13 Ferrero, L’Europa giovane.
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and it makes the whole country impervious to socialism, by which all 
other peoples feel threatened.”14 
Individualism was a key factor for keen admirers of the greatness of the 
British Empire. One of the most enthusiastic was Giuseppe Bevione, a 
nationalist, expansionist and imperialist who became well known over his 
impassioned support for the Libyan war.15 The year before the Italo-
Turkish conflict, as London correspondent for La Stampa, he published 
in book form his observations on modern Britain, starting with an ecstatic 
reflection on the metropolitan vastness of London, “the city of the world 
that elicits the most compelling admiration, giving the visitor an unforget-
table memory”: “Why? What creates the extraordinarily powerful fascina-
tion of London, the indescribable emanation of sublimeness that seizes you 
the moment you tumble out of Charing Cross station into the oceanic 
maelstrom of the Strand?”16 In the end, the dazzling modernity and the 
imperial primacy of the British capital was due, in Bevione’s opinion, to 
its moral character (“It is in Britain’s [...] soul rather than its coal, that 
the roots of its imperial greatness were driven by destiny”),17 and ulti-
mately, again, to the nation’s native individualism: “Britain is strong, 
because it believes in and counts on individual energies alone. [...] That 
is to say, a nation of strong individuals which also demands respect when 
they express themselves in collective endeavor.”18 
As the first decade of the twentieth century ended, however, it no 
longer seemed possible to consider the British Empire’s gains without also 
noting various indications of a weakening in its previously unquestioned 
primacy. A blended and thoughtful report on the British affairs, such as 
economist Riccardo Dalla Volta’s, had been pointing out the profound 
changes in its political and economic arrangement which counteracted the 
emergence of protectionist and aggressive jingoism, namely the growing 
intervention of the state, the heavy taxation on landed property which 
subsidized the introduction of old age pensions, and above all the weaken-
ing of the House of lords, devised by Asquith’s Parliament Act; although, 
Dalla Volta believed that “the English political genius, essentially practical, 
is a master in unifying the opposites. Therefore a confident expectation 
is not groundless”.19 Even Bevione listed the most obvious signs of change: 
German and American competition threatened the profits of British trade 
14 Gargàno, Anglo-Sassoni e latini.
15 Bevione, Come siamo andati a Tripoli.
16 Bevione, L’Inghilterra d’oggi, 5.
17 Ibid., 9.
18 Ibid., 392-393.
19 Dalla Volta, Saggi economici e finanziari sull’Inghilterra, 24. 
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and industry; Fabian and trade union socialism had made great strides; 
protectionism seemed inevitable: “The factors that have paved the way 
for the arrival of socialism in Britain are the same ones that, on other 
fronts, will bring to this foggy island from the continent the taxation 
regime that was Joe Chamberlain’s final advice to his country; they are 
the same factors that have started to break away the jewels in the heavy 
crown of British industrial and commercial hegemony.”20 
The reasons lay in the waning of the individualism that had sustained 
the strong development of the Victorian age: “the beginning of decline 
coincides with a weakening of individualist instincts, and with a diver-
sion of national thinking away from the individualist current of previ-
ous generations”,21 exposing the British Empire to the growing German 
threat, which was now not only commercial but was also becoming 
military.
In the aftermath of World War I, the victorious and even larger British 
Empire seemed to have recovered its previous prestige. Camillo Pellizzi, 
at the time teaching assistant in Italian studies at University College Lon-
don, as well as one of the founders of the London Fascio, delegate to the 
Fasci of Great Britain and Ireland, correspondent of Mussolini’s news-
paper “Il Popolo d’Italia” and, in Italy, member of the Fascist party 
national committee for education, published a very sympathetic account 
of his experiences and observations about the English life and society. 
In his concluding remarks, he intended to set straight the Italian opinion 
concerning the Empire, maintaining that “the greatest nonsense the Italians 
told have always been about the British Empire: [...] Wicked Albion 
grabbed, devoured, exploited... The world has to work to fatten the five-
meals people... A tyrannical, selfish, hypocritical people.”22 On the con-
trary, in Pellizzi’s view, “the British Empire was born not because the 
Britons of the time made up their minds to get themselves an Empire, 
whatever its cost, but because they were cruising the word, doing things, 
and after a time the Empire became a necessity”.23 Pellizzi’s was another 
version of the classical Seeley’s “absent-minded imperialist”: Britain is an 
island, the Britons were increasingly trading, the seas were patrolled by 
the Spanish and then by the Dutch; the Britons had to secure the courses 
to the (mainly Asian and African) markets, so “for to have a free Britain 
it was expedient to rule the oceans”: “not a direct or indirect rule of 
peoples, but only the absolute rule of the sea courses, in order to protect 
20 Ibid., 362.
21 Ibid., 393.
22 Pellizzi, Cose d’Inghilterra, 263.
23 Ibid., 264. 
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business”.24 The colonies were just settlements of dropouts and jailbirds, 
or speculative enterprises for ruthless and daring pioneers, which eventually 
produced the Raj, the Dominions and the other territories. The British race, 
instead of getting discouraged in front of other nations’ preponderance, was 
able to stand together in a long and protracted effort to overcome its 
competitors; it eventually succeeded in achieving its goal, and above all 
was able to preserve its strength and energy, to keep its rivals at bay. “This 
should teach the blabbermouths that it’s the strength, that is to say the 
human will, which overcomes the obstacles and creates new situations, 
new fortunes and privileges [...] Instead of judging, we should learn.”25 
Thus, it wasn’t a question of hostility towards the British Empire, but, at 
best, of emulation. 
It is worth noticing that Pellizzi was considered “the major intellectual 
of the Fasci abroad”;26 that he was a prominent contributor in the corpo-
rative debate; that in a few years he became correspondent from London 
for the main Italian newspaper (the “Corriere della Sera”); and, most 
importantly, that he was Mussolini’s valued counsellor for British affairs. 
His non-hostile attitude towards the British Empire deserves to be taken 
into account. A revealing feature of his viewpoint on the British Empire 
should be pointed out: “Naturally, the British Empire is engraved with 
the seal of the difficulties from which it arose. It bears a somehow com-
mercial and bourgeois character. It doesn’t possess a profound spiritual 
unity. It doesn’t carry any substantial mystical and esthetical imprint. Its 
meaning and ethical value are very vague, and not exceedingly profound. 
The comparisons with the Roman Empire, so often made by British 
authors, should show the latter in advantage. The only ethical purpose of 
the British Empire is to allow freedom of trade and industry of the Euro-
pean kind in almost the entire world. It’s a commercial Empire, granting 
freedom over the seas for all trades, and the opportunity of exploitation 
of entire continents for the Europeans, better still if Anglo-Saxons.”27
2. a contested legacy
The claim of the Roman heritage underlying the hint at the com-
parisons between Roman and British Empire, which Pellizzi ascribed to 
British authors, is worth remarking. Indeed, the ideas of Empire in early 
24 Ibid., 265.
25 Ibid., 266-267. 
26 See Baldoli, Exporting Fascism, 145.
27 Pellizzi, Cose d’Inghilterra, 268.
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twentieth century Britain were diverse, even divergent, and it has been 
appropriately noticed that the complexity, diversity, and sheer size of the 
Empire itself, as well as the different aims that fostered the Imperial 
sentiments – as it was particularly apparent during the Tariff Reform 
debate – made it difficult even to refer to a singular and univocal British 
Empire.28 Nonetheless, on a cultural terrain can be traced a pattern of 
recurrent references to the Roman Empire, made by a wide range of 
authors throughout the decades of the building and consolidation of the 
British Empire. It was a pattern which moved from the negative view on 
the Roman Empire during the first half of the nineteenth century, which 
drew upon Edward Gibbon’s account of decadence and corruption of 
Caesars’ Rome and was furthered by the hostility towards the French 
Napoleonic and then Second Empire. After the Royal Title Bill (1876), 
which bestowed upon Queen Victoria the title of “Empress of India”, 
more favorable views on the Roman Empire began to assert themselves; 
then, in the late Victorian and Edwardian era, a positive image prevailed, 
often to the advantage of the British imperial model. In Seeley’s outlook, 
there “was a time no doubt when even the Roman Empire, because it 
was despotic and in some periods unhappy and half-barbarous, was 
thought uninteresting [...] I suppose I may say that this way of regarding 
history is now obsolete. We do not read it simply for pleasure, but in 
order that we may discover the laws of political growth and change [...] 
It is enough if it is instructive and teaches us lessons not to be learned 
from other periods. Hence the Roman Empire – not only in its begin-
nings but in its later developments up to the thirteenth century – is now 
regarded, in spite of all the barbarism, all the superstition, and all the 
misery, as one of the most interesting of all the historical phenomena. 
[...] We discern in it the embryo of that which is greatest and most won-
derful, namely, the modern brotherhood or loose federation of civilised 
nations”.29
28 Howe, Ideas of Empire in Britain around 1900, 1-12. The extent to which the very 
existence of the British Empire depended on British ideology, culture, politics, education 
and society as a whole, across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is still the subject 
of debate between historians. It lies within the context of an increased interest in imperial 
and global history that continues to generate wider and comparative studies. See, for 
instance, Howe, The New Imperial Histories Reader; Brendon, The Decline and Fall; Levine, 
The British Empire; Darwin, The Empire Project; Magee and Thompson, Empire and 
Globalisation; Louis, The Oxford History of the British Empire. For their relevance to this 
topic see Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?; Thompson, ed. Britain’s Experience of 
Empire; Hall, Civilising Subjects; Hall and Rose, eds. At Home with the Empire.
29 Seeley, The Expansion of England, 274-276.
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The issue has been accurately investigated;30 indeed, when Britain was 
at its imperial peak the parallel with Rome was implicitly considered a 
“natural” outcome of British imperial supremacy.31 Assuming this, the 
Roman model was scanned by British authors, in order to detect which 
of its virtues and vices could be respectively reproduced or avoided for the 
maintenance of the Empire: “How did the Romans hold their Empire for 
so long a time? How has the British Empire been held together up to 
date? And by what means, judging by the experience, and from the signs 
of the times, are we likely to continue to hold it?”32 By trying to dispel the 
Gibbonian prophecy that saw all the empires after the Roman eventually 
doomed to share its destiny of decline, they actually revealed a much 
nuanced and even insecure attitude that was apparent, at least to contem-
porary Italian observers. Somehow, a shadow of the “Gibbonian pessi-
mism” could always be detected in the most boastful of imperialists.33 
After all, it was John Seeley, in concluding his treatise, who felt the need 
to distance the Roman shadow of decline, by stating that it “is not an 
Empire attached to England in the same ways as the Roman Empire was 
attached to Rome; it will not drag us down, or infect us at home with 
oriental notions or methods of government. Nor it is an Empire which 
costs us money or hampers our finances. It is self-supporting, and is held 
at arm’s length in such a way that our destiny is not closely entangled with 
its own”.34
Essays entirely devoted to the issue of drawing a parallel between 
Roman and British imperialism, published in the Edwardian era, could 
display a blended approach, like Lord Cromers’, which sought to highlight 
the points of similarity – the reluctance to take the steps towards estab-
lishing empire, the need to secure the frontiers, the audacity in making 
new conquests, the use of local auxiliaries – as well as the differences – 
the Romans were more open to assimilation;35 or they could be more 
committed, like Lucas’, in pointing out the improvements, in terms of 
civilization, that the British achieved over the Roman Empire. Or they 
30 See Hingley, Roman Officers and English Gentlemen, 17-27.
31 See, for the relationship between classical education and imperial attitude, Symonds, 
Oxford and Empire.
32 Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater Britain.
33 For an analysis of “Gibbonian pessimism” and the fear of decline as a driver for the 
continued British imperial expansion, see Brendon, The Decline and Fall. See also McKit-
terick and Quinault, Edward Gibbon and Empire.
34 Seeley, The Expansion of England, 354.
35 Earl of Cromer, Ancient and Modern Imperialism. It’s worth noticing that in his essay 
the first Viceroy of Egypt advocated the complete self-government for the Dominions (Ibid., 
15).
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could even consider the matter so closely a mirror of present day issues, 
that its contemplation should be considered always in progress: “A com-
parison of these two great dominions in their point of resemblance and 
difference, points in which the phenomena of each serve to explain and 
illustrate the parallel phenomena of the other, is a subject which has engaged 
the attention of many philosophic minds, and is still far from being 
exhausted. Exhausted indeed it can scarcely be, for every year brings some 
changes in the condition of Indian government, and nearly every year 
gives us some fresh light upon the organization and government of the 
Roman Empire.”36 But in all cases, they considered the simile a given fact, 
not to be further argued.
If the parallel with Rome was so ingrained in the self-representation of 
the British imperial culture to be almost taken for granted, for the Fascist’s 
outlook the most immediate and unquestioned parallel was with the British 
Empire, with which Italian imperial ambitions were compared. We have 
noticed in the first section that during the late Liberal period it was con-
sidered the epitome of modernity and industrial power, and that most of 
those features were maintained in the first years of the Fascist regime. 
There was a continuity in seeing the British Empire as the expression 
of industrial and commercial modernity and its resultant strength, but 
what in the Liberal period was seen as an unparalleled superiority under 
Fascism became a supremacy acquired in a particular period but now 
exhibiting signs of decline, which Fascism should contest and surpass. 
This competitiveness towards Britain, which historiography has principally 
seen as a component of foreign policy,37 might reveal additional signifi-
cance when matched with the images of Empire and the claim of the Roman 
legacy which ultimately, in Fascist political culture, relates to the concept 
of the State. 
Indeed, Fascism’s antagonism towards Britain became increasingly appar-
ent during the 1930s. Key figures expressed a competitive resentment 
towards Britain and its dominant international position, seeing it as the 
embodiment of “modern” imperial power against which Fascism was des-
tined to be measured. It was a mixed feeling: admiration of the British was 
combined with disparagement and bitterness; prominent Fascist officials 
grudgingly acknowledged the British unparalleled virtues, only to challenge 
their superiority. As Bernard Porter says of foreign observers in general, “For 
them, Britain was defined by her empire, and by the power, arrogance, and 
36 Bryce, The Ancient Roman Empire and the British Empire in India, 1.
37 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World; Bosworth, The Italian Dictatorship; Bosworth, 
Mussolini’s Italy, 277-306, 367-395; Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire; Collotti, 
Fascismo e politica di potenza.
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sometimes atrocious behavior they associated with it. This was because the 
face Britain usually presented to them, as foreigners, was the imperial 
one.”38 It was not necessary to be friendly with Great Britain and its empire 
to be attracted to it, as is seen in Buruma’s amusing portrayal of Emperor 
Wilhelm II, “the Anglomane who hated England”, who proudly wore the 
uniform of a British navy admiral, read Kipling and P.G. Wodehouse, and 
unconditionally admired his grandmother, Queen Victoria.39 
Dino Grandi, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1929-1932) then Italian 
ambassador in London (1932-1939), was prone to restate the usual ste-
reotypes then current in Italy regarding the British national character: 
“These British do not teach much Latin, Mathematic or Greek, it is true; 
but they teach how to be men, to have character, and to achieve that 
arrogance, which is the secret of their greatness”. And by comparison, his 
view of the British mirrored the shortcomings of his own compatriots’ 
behavior: “We Italians are not arrogant enough. It is one thing to be noisy 
and boastful, and another to be quietly arrogant. If we could learn some 
of the virtues of these Romans of Britain, we would be the world’s leading 
people”. Again, in his diary he observed that the British as a whole were 
“cold, uncultured and very great, like the Romans”.40
Grandi’s identification of the contemporary British with the ancient 
Romans, made within the confines of his diary and never expressed in any 
writing for public circulation, expressed a problematic admiration that 
even one of the first Fascists like Grandi could not hide, at least from 
himself. This intensified the antagonism between the Mediterranean aspi-
rations of the Fascist regime, which projected the myth of romanità onto 
itself with increasing readiness and commitment, and the people that by 
their deeds, with their dominating qualities, had for almost two centuries 
been the embodiment of the idea of empire. 
3. the reversal of the gibbonian metaphor: 
state and romanità vs. modernity
Interwoven admiration and criticism for the British people were not 
just the expression of a complex but well-known competitive approach to 
Great Britain and its position of supremacy in international relationships. 
They also reflected the belief that having an imperial dimension was an 
essential attribute of power with a “modern” basis, as the British Empire 
38 Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, 304.
39 Buruma, Anglomania, 199-222.
40 Dino Grandi, quoted in Nello, Dino Grandi, 141. All the italics are mine.
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had been demonstrating for at least two centuries.41 Thus, in a transposi-
tion of the perspective of Edward Gibbon, the horizon was anxiously 
scanned for any signs of the decline that would necessarily follow the high 
point of the greatness it had already achieved: in Italy in the 1930s and 
early 1940s Fascist leaflets and studies announced the “nemesis of history”, 
which was to send British domination “to the archaeological museum of 
dead civilizations”.42 
It is not surprising that Roberto Forges Davanzati, during the months 
of preparation for the assault on Ethiopia, emphasized the imperial inter-
ests which determined British hostility towards Fascism’s African plans, a 
hostility heightened by the action of the League of Nations. As he never 
tired of explaining in Cronache del regime, his daily evening radio program 
broadcast by EIAR, that the Italy-Abyssinia dispute was simply a colonial 
clash between a great nation such as Italy, now back in the European 
forefront thanks to Fascism, and a feudal slave-driving kingdom, Ethiopia, 
which should not be allowed the status of “nation”. It was a conflict that 
ought to be resolved on African soil and contained there, without reper-
cussions in the European context: “The dangers of this clash for Europe 
and the world lie exclusively in the pseudo-internationalist presentation 
of it that has been attempted. This has been the particular and very unfor-
tunate political endeavor of the British Conservative government, which 
has shown itself to be clearly only acting in its own authentically imperialist 
interests, but thought it could conceal these behind a mask of international-
ist disinterestedness and zeal. There are two reasons for this: to present 
itself in Europe and the world as an advocate for universal peace; and to 
give itself an advantage, on the eve of elections, in relation to the Labour 
opposition which exploits the internationalist myth, especially now that 
Bolshevik Russia has arrived in Geneva”.43
It is even less surprising that this anti-British approach was revived 
during the Second World War: from “God curse the English”, the graphic 
daily refrain of Mario Appelius, another radio journalist,44 to the more 
41 Edwards, ed. Roman Presences; Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain.
42 “La crisi dell’Impero Britannico”, 46. See also Italicus, La guerra contro l’Inghilterra. 
But see in addition the 1932 Italian translation of the work by French writer André Sieg-
fried (1932), published in the series Libri scelti per servire al panorama del nostro tempo.
43 Forges Davanzati, Cronache del Regime, 113.
44 It would in fact be somewhat simplistic to describe Roberto Forges Davanzati as a 
“radio journalist”. Before Galeazzo Ciano, then head of the regime’s press office, gave him 
the task of the daily radio programme “Cronaca del regime” in 1933, Forges Davanzati had 
been a leading exponent of Italian nationalism, and joined the Fascist Party in 1923. See also 
Casmirri, “Forges Davanzati, Roberto”. On Gayda, Forges Davanzati and other journalists 
mentioned later, see Forno, Informazione e potere, and Allotti, Giornalisti di regime.
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subtle observations of Virginio Gayda, one of the publicists closest to the 
Fascist government, diplomatic commentator of the Giornale d’Italia and 
accredited as the official spokesperson for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
an adviser to Galeazzo Ciano and an experienced observer of international 
politics.45 In 1941 Gayda, at the end of a lengthy treatise summarizing 
45 As a correspondent for La Stampa and then L’Idea Nazionale, Gayda was witness to 
international politics and among the most important observers; he was in Vienna before 
the Great War, in Russia during the war, and then in European capitals for the years of 
the post-war crisis, and established himself as one of the most perceptive Italian analysts. 
Colonial postcard illustrated by cartoonist Aldo Scabia, printed in 1936, 
featuring an Italian Empire builder with rifle and spade, sporting in his back 
the Mussolinian trademark assertion “Me ne frego!” [I don’t care!], with the 
legend “Quando l’Inghilterra era nella barbarie, Roma imperava in Africa” 
[When England was still in barbarity, Rome ruled in Africa]
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British-Italian relations from the Risorgimento to the present, attempted 
to present the Italy-Germany Axis as architect of the “construction of a 
new order in Europe with separate but coordinated tasks, in united com-
munities, for the great ruling nations”: “The new European order is the 
direct antithesis of the old order conceived and pursued by Britain during 
the centuries of its domination. British policy, up to the war against 
Germany and Italy, aimed at the destruction, not construction, of Euro-
pean unity. It only kept its eye on the continent and European waters in 
order to seek anything that would serve its immediate political supremacy 
and its military power. Its only concerns were to separate the European 
peoples, meddle with and oppose their interests, subjugate the weaker 
countries, and damage, as much as possible, the stronger and more inde-
pendent ones, those most capable of attracting and organizing the other 
nations.”46 
The inevitability of Anglo-Italian hostility was easily argued: the British 
had an empire and wanted to preserve and enlarge this, opportunistically 
balancing international alliances and enmities to this end, while the new 
Italy was “imprisoned” by the British navy in the Mediterranean. The 
justification for Italy’s African aspirations was made with reference to the 
old concept of the Mediterranean as an “inner sea”, safe passage across 
which was essential for it to have freedom of action: “Italy seeks freedom 
and control in the Mediterranean above all to ensure the defense of its 
territory, the independence of its national and economic life, and con-
nectedness for its various populations, which are distributed across the 
peninsula, the islands and the more distant lands of Africa. Italy seeks 
freedom on the inner sea in order to achieve [...] unfettered contact with 
the civilized peoples of the world, and with the earth’s primary resources 
that are needed for the work of its great productive culture. [...] Because 
of this, the war against Britain is one of the most serious and defining 
moments in Italy’s entire national history after the end of the Roman 
Empire. [...] It is the natural continuation and essential epilogue to the 
wars of the Risorgimento. [...] The Italian nation cannot live freely on its 
territory if it is not free to move and provide for itself on the sea that 
surrounds it, if it cannot freely leave this closed sea, whose gates are 
controlled by Britain, and if it does not make the independence of both 
In 1921 he was appointed editor of Il Messaggero, followed Fascism’s rise to power sympa-
thetically, and was one of the editors closest to Mussolini. From 1926 he edited Il Giornale 
d’Italia, where his articles informally followed the government line on foreign affairs. 
Gayda strongly supported the racial policies that the regime adopted, initially regarding 
colonial citizens and then Jews. See also Canali, “Gayda, Virginio”.
46 Gayda, Italia e Inghilterra, 549.
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its foreign policy and its economy secure from competing international 
causes, and from contingent or permanent foreign controls.”47 
The idea of the “spiritual” nature of a continuing Risorgimento also 
faithfully reiterated the post-Mazzinian stylistic feature of the universalist 
ambitions of Italian nationalism, which, as Fascist scholar Carlo Curcio 
declared, transcended the self-interest of individual nations to establish 
itself as a superior entity, “as the central part of a system, as an element 
of an organization that is above all spiritual and therefore civilized”.48 In 
Gayda’s argument, however, the insistence on criticizing British ruthless-
ness cut across his promotion of the model of spiritual and universalist 
imperialism, persistently complaining about the manipulative attitude and 
selfish motive of its foreign policy. He recalled that it had been Britain, 
in competition with France for controlling Egypt after the opening of the 
Suez Canal, which “invited” Italy into the Horn of Africa, while at the 
same time letting France occupy Tunisia in 1881, to keep it away from 
the Red Sea, but failing to support Italy in consolidating its possessions, 
thus paving the way for the shameful defeat of Adua (1896). And this was 
not to mention the purposes served by inviting Italy to join the Entente, 
the broken promises of the London Pact, the dispersal of the colonies of 
Wilhelm II’s defeated empire without considering Italy, and so on. But, 
in addition to the obvious symptoms of feelings of inferiority, there was 
another motive that fostered the insistent resentment towards British “cold-
ness”, “impassiveness” and “indifference” when faced with Italy’s essential 
needs. It was revealed by a transparent historical parallel, located at the end 
of the treatise: “The war between Rome and Carthage seems to anticipate, 
far back in history, the war between Italy and Great Britain. [...] Carthage 
weighed down on Rome with its great fleet, threatening the Mediterranean 
and the Italian peninsula, its constructive politics, its trading, and its need 
for expansion.”49 
Gayda was writing in 1941. With the role of the Carthaginians given to 
the British, and Rome’s legacy to Fascism, he stressed the contrast between 
the imperial aspirations of the Latin city and those of the Phoenician 
colony. The difference lay in the diverse nature of their push for expan-
sion, one being the expression of “a peasant and warrior people, anxious 
for order and work”, while the other reflected “a trading, speculating, 
47 Ibid., 545-546.
48 Gentile, La Grande Italia, 174. As Emilio Gentile argues in his many writings on 
the subject, Fascist Italy “had ambitions to take its place on a level of epoch-making 
superiority compared to other kinds of European nationalism, presenting itself both as a 
national and universal revolution” (Gentile, La Grande Italia, 173).
49 Gayda, Italia e Inghilterra, 446-447.
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commercial and aggressive people”. Above all, they were differentiated by 
contrasting ideas about supremacy, which for Gayda also had to have an 
overall strategic purpose. There was an obvious allusion to the Mediter-
ranean objectives of Mussolini’s “parallel war” alongside Italy’s German 
ally: “Rome, fighting Carthage, was not only thinking about its defense 
and its power. The aim was in fact to create unity and harmony among 
the Mediterranean peoples.”50
The reversal of Gibbon’s metaphor outlined by Gayda held within it a 
reference to what was, despite everything, the epitome of modern imperial 
power, by which Fascism was compelled to measure itself. But the British 
Empire was not only modern, it had been for decades acknowledged as 
the embodiment of the historical legacy of Roman dominating strength. 
Thus, antagonism towards the British has much clearer significance when 
seen from this neo-Gibbonian perspective. To reclaim the legacy of “that 
Rome where Christ is a Roman”, in Dante’s well-known verse, which saw 
the creation of “the powerful entity of the Christian church, which also 
inherited in part the concept of imperial power and one day had to sub-
ject sovereigns and peoples to its moral authority”.51 The comparison of 
the British with the Carthaginians indicated the negative meaning ascribed 
to the “modernity” of the British Empire: this was a commercial modernity, 
expressing the strength of money and capital, and in decline, as it was the 
antithesis of the new civilization represented by Fascism, which was 
rooted in the myth of “romanità”.52
While there was thus continuity between the late Liberal age and Fascism 
in regarding the British Empire as the latest expression of contemporary 
industrial and commercial modernity, it was a continuity whose values 
became inverted. What in the Liberal period had represented an unri-
valled superiority – individualism, sternness of character and entrepre-
neurial daring, all of which had supported the expansion of British rule 
across the world –, became the mask of a dominance which Fascism was 
obliged to contest and overcome. The industrial and commercial moder-
nity, which was the essence of the British Empire, in 1930s Fascism 
became a negative feature, although the dimensions of power and strength 
continued to correspond to the image of the Empire. The Roman legacy 
claimed by fascist spokesmen implied that the Empire had to be strong 
50 Ibid., 446.
51 Pais, “Il significato politico della storia di Roma”, 30.
52 See Canfora, Ideologie del classicismo; Canfora, Le vie del classicismo; Canfora, La 
democrazia; Cagnetta, Antichisti e Impero fascista; Carandini et al., I giorni di Roma; Stone, 
“A flexible Rome: Fascism and the cult of romanità”; Nelis, From Ancient to Modern: The 
Myth of Romanità during the Ventennio Fascista. 
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and powerful, but not industrial and modern (that would be a Carthaginian 
empire). Instead, it had to be brought back to the one essential feature of 
Romanità, that was, the power of the State. The autonomy and strength 
of the State were an important feature of Fascism’s self-representation and 
of its legal culture, and in this light the possession of an empire came to 
be seen as an essential aspect of statehood and power. It is well known 
that after its re-establishment as a discipline by Orlando in the late nine-
teenth century, Italian public law focused on defining the attributes of 
statehood.53 There has also been further exploration of the crucial role of 
legal culture in establishing the autonomy and strength of the State as a 
distinctive element of Fascism’s self-representation.54 As has been high-
lighted recently by detailed research on the ideological elements within the 
culture of the lawyers engaged in determining colonial law in the 1930s,55 
possession of an empire came to be the fundamental attribute of state-
hood and power. This should also explain why the acquisition of colonies 
under Fascism, unlike during the Liberal period,56 was only partially 
accompanied by preparatory studies on the potential profitability of the 
territories to be occupied, but was the product of a strategy of power that 
was eminently political.57
The reference to the ancient, namely Roman imperial model was a 
driving force in the formation of Italian imperial motives. It entailed the 
claim of the Roman legacy formerly acknowledged to the British Empire, 
which also managed to incorporate modernity, strength and power within 
its image. From this perspective, in the context of international competi-
tion for imperial influence, influential Italian journalists and theoreticians 
drew on contrasting ideas of power, modernity, and imperial identities, 
where the obsessive claiming of the Roman legacy was a transparent met-
aphor to express the competitive attitude towards the British Empire. 
Finally, we have seen how, especially in the 1930s when international 
politics and imperial ambitions cut across each other, the rivers of rheto-
ric of romanità, identified the true obstacle to Fascism’s Mediterranean 
and African ambitions as being Britain’s undisputed supremacy. By claim-
ing the legacy of romanità in the Mediterranean, Fascism revealed its 
53 On this issue see the volume edited by Mazzacane, ed. I giuristi e la crisi dello Stato 
liberale, especially the contributions by Luisa Mangoni and Giulio Cianferotti.
54 Gentile, Lanchester and Tarquini, Alfredo Rocco: dalla crisi del parlamentarismo; 
Battente, Alfredo Rocco, dal parlamentarismo al fascismo; D’Alfonso, Costruire lo Stato forte; 
Sordi, “Corporativismo e dottrina dello Stato”. 
55 De Napoli, La prova della razza; De Cristofaro, Codice della persecuzione.
56 Monina, Il consenso coloniale; Monina, La Grande Italia marittima. 
57 Soravia, “Ascesa e declino dell’orientalismo scientifico”.
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intention to compete with the British Empire; this was a kind of inversion 
of Gibbon’s prophecy, which saw the future of the British colonies pre-
figured in the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. For Fascism, in 
asserting the absolute – and belated – necessity of the acquisition of an 
empire, this came to represent the fundamental proof of power, and an 
essential aspect of Statehood.
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